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Trần Đức Thảo:  
A Marxist Theory of the Origins of Human Language
Abstract. This paper will explore Trần Đức Thảo’s (Từ sơn, Bắc ninh, september 
26th, 1917 – paris, april 24th, 1993) work from historical, philosophical, and linguistic 
points of view. most notably it will focus on Thảo’s Recherches sur l’origine du 
langage et de la conscience (1973). according to marx and engels, Thảo argued 
that language was originally constituted during collective cooperative activities. 
and he also suggested that human specific skills appeared for the first time with 
the production of first tools. To him, language arose as gestural and verbal indication 
involved in task-oriented cooperative activities already in hominid societies. Trying 
to integrate piaget’s child development psychology with the findings of spirkin’s 
anthropology, Thảo described six stages of evolution of genus homo.
Keywords: marxism; phenomenology; origins of language; Tool-making; social 
cognition.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to describe and discuss the hypothesis on the 
origins of human language suggested by a vietnamese philosopher Trần 
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Đức Thảo.1 he wrote some works devoted to linguistic and anthropological 
issues and his two most famous books, namely Phenomenology and 
Dialectical Materialism (pdm, published in 1951) and Investigations into 
the origins of language and consciousness (ilc, published in 1973), reveal 
the development of his theory on the origins of language. it is not the task 
of this paper to offer a detailed description of Thảo’s theory. What has to be 
stressed is only that some assumptions of his theory remained untouched 
between 1951 and 1973. and, maybe, Thảo’s thought might still be useful to 
evaluate and appreciate certain hypotheses on the origins of human language 
which have been set out in the last few decades.
Thảo was considered one of the most relevant scholars and experts 
of phenomenology during the 1940s and the 1950s. But since he is not 
so famous nowadays, a brief and succinct list of biographical indications 
does not result inessential.2 Thảo was born in vietnam on 26 september 
1917. interestingly, in the very year of the russian revolution and, in this 
regard, one cannot forget that Thảo’s life had been deeply and constantly 
influenced by the political ups and downs of the eastern Block. from 1936 
to 1951 he studied, wrote and worked in paris. simultaneously, he enjoyed 
the political activities of the vietnamese anti-colonial movement and became 
a representative of the french marxist intelligentsia. in the 1940s he became 
one of first scholars who directly studied the unpublished writings of edmund 
husserl (1859–1938) and, then, he was regarded as one of the most relevant 
experts of husserl’s philosophy. so he took part in a large debate on the 
relation between phenomenology and marxism together with other authors 
such as Jean-paul sartre (1905–1980), maurice merleau-ponty (1908–1961), 
alexandre Kojève (1902–1968), Jean-Toussaint desanti (1914–2002), and 
others.
Thảo’s political engagement became stronger than the academic 
interests. after he published his first book in 1951, he decided to return to 
vietnam to actively take part in the resistance against the french. in the 
early years, Thảo worked as a professor at hanoi university and his writings 
of the period were focused on hegelian philosophy and on the history 
of philosophy. in 1957 he expressed his scepticism about the method of re-
education. one cannot forget that it was the period of the de-stalinization 
 1  This paper represents the written version of a talk given at the International Work-
shop. Theory of Language and the Debate on Language Origins. (Trento, department of hu-
manities, 18–20 november 2015).
 2  for more details see Thảo (1986, pp. 1–11), Thảo (1993), papin (2013), giao 
(1988), hémery (2013), Thảo (2004, 2013), and feron (2014).
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and political reformism in communist countries, and that the vietnamese 
communist party was adverse to any form of revisionism. as a consequence 
of his criticism, Thảo was tried and sentenced, and his imprisonment lasted 
until 1961.
after he had left prison he was no longer allowed to write in vietnamese. 
so he was forced to write in french and he consequently sent his writings 
to some french reviewers. Between the 1960s and 1970s he broke away 
from husserlian philosophy radically. in this period, in fact, Thảo’s 
aim was to suggest a materialist anthropological theory on the origins 
of human cognition. in this way, he started writing again several articles 
and a book on the origins of human language. during the 1980s the control 
procedure had been loosened thanks to the spirit of the general reformism 
of perestroika. so Thảo restarted to take part in the vietnamese political 
debate. in the meantime, he began to be even more interested in questions 
concerning logical methods. in 1991 he finally returned to france and died 
in paris on 24 april 1993.
2. Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism
PDM (Thảo, [1951] 1985) is divided into two parts. The first one La méthode 
phénoménologique et son contenu effectivement réel (The phenomenological 
method and its actual real content) was composed between 1942 and 1950. 
for the most part, that section contains a description of «the essential 
features of phenomenology from a purely historical point of view» (Thảo, 
[1951] 1985, p. XXi). in the last chapter of the first part, Thảo explained 
husserl’s concrete analysis of lived experience which husserl had introduced 
in his unpublished works. in those pages, Thảo did not codify dialectical 
materialism as an alternative to husserl’s phenomenology and preferred to 
integrate husserlian philosophy into marxism. Thus Thảo suggested a sort 
of naturalization of husserl’s phenomenology (Benoist, 2013).
To Thảo, materiality (Dinglichkeit, matérialité) «is not merely a substrate 
indifferent to the significations which it bears» ([1951] 1985, p. XXiii) but 
rather it is the real infrastructure on which the intellectual superstructures 
are founded.3 so Thảo reinterpreted the husserlian notion of lifeworld 
 3  in this way Thảo subscribed himself to the approach of the dialectical materialism. 
With regard to dialectical materialism see Jordan (1967) and Thomas (2008). With regard to 
the dichotomy between economic base and superstructures see MEW 13: 1–11 (i.e. Preface to 
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(Lebenswelt, monde de la vie).4 it is the dimension of the sensible life, 
the real world in which we live and act. The lifeworld is the horizon in which 
the ideal forms of thought (ideologies, religions, philosophies, and so on) 
take place. as a result, to Thảo, the husserlian transcendental ego is the 
sensible embodied historical ego.
To Thảo consciousness is nothing but nature becoming human 
in the real sensible life. according to him, the most relevant lack 
of husserl’s phenomenology concerned the awareness of the sensible 
origin of consciousness. and that lack depends upon the intrinsic dualism 
of husserlian account. But husserlian philosophy, Thảo continued, could 
be useful to describe animal cognition. so he applied the phenomenological 
theory of consciousness to animal kingdom. instead, human cognition 
requires other theoretical tools and especially the theory of human history 
suggested by Karl marx (1818–1883) and friedrich engels (1820–1885).
Thảo described animal cognition by evoking some recent scientific 
theories suggested by such scholars like louis charles henri piéron (1881–
1964), rémy perrier (1861–1936), Kurt sgonina (1914–1939), and Wolfgang 
Köhler (1887–1967). interestingly, Thảo put in relation the scientific 
findings of those scholars with hausserlian description of consciousness. To 
make this point clearer, it could be useful to remember the cognitive stages 
described by husserl: impression, sensation, sensorial field, object-phantom, 
real object, real relation, image, representation, and concept. To Thảo, those 
stages correspond to the different degrees of intelligent behaviour which one 
may observe in animal kingdom. more specifically, each cognitive stage 
corresponds to the following organisms: protista, sponges, coelenterates, 
worms, fish, mammals, lower apes, anthropoids, and humans. The link 
between husserlian description of the stages of consciousness and the chain 
of organisms entails the following sequence of behavioural development: 
attraction and repulsion, contraction, reflex displacement, locomotion, 
apprehension, detour and manipulation, intermediary, instrument, tool-
making, and language.
When Thảo described the structures of behaviour from coelenterates to 
humans, he constantly mentioned Jean piaget’s (1896–1980) theory about 
sensory-motor development of the child. in this way, Thảo implicitly assumed 
A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859); and Bottomore (1991, pp. 45–48), 
harman (1986), and Tomberg (1969).
 4  for the notion of Lebenswelt in husserl’s late writings see Hua vi (i.e. The Crisis 
of European Sciences): XXiX, XXXiX; and perreau (2010), claesges (1972), Kerckhoven 
(1985), and Waldenfels (1971).
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the “biogenetical fundamental” rule set out by ernst haeckel (1834–1919): 
the ontogeny recapitulates the phylogeny. Thus Thảo integrated piaget’s 
insight into a more general theory of the evolution of consciousness. and, 
in this way, he implicitly recalled merleau ponty’s account of embodied 
consciousness set out in La structure du comportement (1942) and 
in Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). 
To Thảo ([1951] 1985, pp. 145–146), the development of behaviour 
depends upon the inhibition of most primitive conducts. in other words, 
a given manifestation of behaviour is the result of the inhibition of a simpler 
type of behaviour. What husserl called consciousness is nothing but 
the reflex of a given mode of behaviour. so the awareness of both, the object 
and the self, is the result of the interaction between the physiology of a given 
organism and the environment instead of being the point of departure 
for a behavioural mode. in fact, the evolution of cerebral cortex marks 
the development of ever more sophisticated systems of inhibition. and that 
evolution changes the interaction with the physical environment.
3. The first hypothesis on Language Origins
To Thảo, the description of the manipulation, the instrument-making, and 
the tool-making may elucidate the three main stages of the evolution from 
anthropoids to humans. among anthropoids, the systematic use of instruments 
(instruments) is already at work. in contrast to apes, anthropoids recognize 
the intrinsic, and not merely occasional, efficacy of instruments. instead, 
apes can only manipulate some natural objects that they find in their 
environment if the occasional need so requires. after offering a description 
of the production of instruments among anthropoids, Thảo ([1951] 1985, 
pp. 163–164) introduced the next stage in the history of cognitive evolution. 
This stage corresponds to the discovery of the tool (outil). The main feature 
of the tool is that it can be produced, preserved and reproduced. But tool-
making emerged only with h. sapiens.
Thảo’s next step was to explain how human language arose from 
the general symbolic function that links sounds and meaning. one 
could observe that function in certain animal communication systems. 
so the faculty of language is nothing but the specialization of a more general 
faculty which one can observe among other mammals. a barking dog shows 
the simplest communication system. The barking is an expression whose 
meaning is sketched out by the barking itself. in this way, the barking dog 
anticipates and signifies its own intention to attack. insofar the dog inhibits 
108 Jacopo D’Alonzo
the attack and sketches it out. for this reason, Thảo’s position might be 
summarized in a brief sentence: “the symbolic act of signification is an act 
that stops at the initial phase of its accomplishment and refers, thereby, to its 
total form that has been left unaccomplished” (Thảo, [1951] 1985, p. 166). a 
communicative act requires two subjects (the ego and the alter-ego) at least. 
They reciprocally display partial communicative acts. not only did the circle 
of communication starts with the communicative act of the ego, it also needs 
the understanding and the corresponding reaction of the alter-ego. and 
the communicative circle ends when the ego understands that the alter-ego 
has understood the first step of that circle. and Thảo described such a circle as 
“an exchange of intentional acts of reciprocal understanding, each affecting 
the other in the very same manner in which he himself is affected: the other 
affects me by means of the affect by which i have affected him” (p. 167).
among anthropoids, and in particular among chimpanzees, the symbolic 
function takes the shape of the simulation: the symbolic act is, alone and 
in itself, regarded as meaningful and for this reason it could be employed to 
hide the real intentions of the actor. so the simulation is a communicative act 
that employs behaviour to achieve goals which are not immediately meant by 
the behaviour itself. according to the findings of meredith crawford (1910–
2002), chimpanzees might take advantage of vocal signs although they cannot 
reach the level of human language. language in strict sense is characterized 
by the fact that it involves concepts. concepts are the historical products 
of both the social life within a given community and the intergenerational 
transmission of habits. in detail, Thảo insisted that language and concepts 
arose in the context of common goal-oriented and cooperative activities 
(tool-making) among our human ancestors. 
To him, during tool-making activities, vocalizations rhythmically 
accompanied the same step of a given sequence of movements. progressively, 
vocalizations allowed the internalization of the bodily-schemata involved 
in the sequence of movements. Then the interjections performed during 
common goal-oriented actions began to refer to bodily-schemata of that 
common activity. Those vocalizations became the first linguistic roots 
and they were the same for all members of the group. likewise, everyone 
understands the same meaning when a given member pronounced those 
vocalizations because the group shares the same joint attentional frame as 
well as the same frame of reference. remarkably, original linguistic signs 
were performed unintentionally. so Thảo did not agree with engels’s 
description of the origins of human language. To engels, indeed, language 
is the result of the need to communicate (MEW 20, pp. 444–455.).
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4. The Language of Real Life
Between 1974 and 1975 the french review La Nouvelle Critique published, 
in two parts, Thảo’s article entitled “de la phénoménologie à la dialectique 
matérialiste de la conscience». although that article chronologically followed 
the publication of Thảo’s ILC, it could be regarded as an introduction to 
some issues which Thảo had discussed in his ILC. “de la phénoménologie » 
reveals Thảo’s interest in ferdinand de saussure’s (1857–1913) linguistics. 
at the time, indeed, Thảo’s main aim was to suggest a semiotic theory which 
allowed him to describe the origins of human language. and his account 
differed from saussure’s regarding the role played by non-totally arbitrary 
signs. insofar saussure ([1916, 1995] 1959, pp. 67–69) had established 
that semiotics must study only the arbitrary aspect of signs, Thảo stressed 
the importance of investigating the motivated aspects of signs.
so Thảo introduced the project of a semiotics that he called “dialectical 
semiology” or “semiotics of the language of real life” whose object is the 
“general system of intrinsic or aesthetic signs”. Thảo’s notion of intrinsic 
signs is the starting point of his semiotic and linguistic proposal. That 
notion could be regarded as the antidote to saussurian excessive reliance 
on the notion of arbitrariness. To clarify, Thảo insisted that nowadays there 
are signs – such as miming, gesturing, pointing, rites, symbols, figurative 
processes, artworks, gestural movements, pantomimes, facial features, and so 
on – whose meaning depends upon the intrinsic and sensible expressiveness 
of the signifier. so Thảo introduced the “material semiotic movement” 
as the peculiar semiotic dynamic system composed of intrinsic signs and 
involved in the social praxis. The system of intrinsic signs is the condition 
for having the general system of arbitrary signs described by saussure. 
insofar intrinsic motivated signs exhibit their own meaning at the sensory 
level, they support the invention of more abstract systems of arbitrary signs 
such as scientific languages.
Thảo invoked the notion of the language of real life in order to explain 
how language initially took the shape of a pragmatic instrument of social 
intercourse. according to marx and engels (MEW 3/11, pp. 26, 30–31), 
Thảo (1974, 1975) called the system of intrinsic signs “language of real 
life” (Sprache des wirklichen Lebens, langage de la vie réele). The german 
philosophers wrote that ideas, conceptions, and language arise from concrete 
social relations. To Thảo the language of real life can be seen as material 
vocal and gestural expressions involved in work activities. so it cannot be 
regarded as an already fully-formed language but rather as a collective semio-
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cognitive infrastructure involved in cooperative collaborative activities. 
and in this way, the language of real life must be seen as a pattern of the 
protolanguage employed by our ancestors.
like marx and engels, Thảo added that human-specific cognition must 
be seen as a social product because it arises as a result of the internalization 
of social praxis by way of the language of the real life. Before the individuals 
employ the language of real life as a tool to communicate their own experience, 
the language of real life has the shape of a social fact that exists outside 
individuals. almost the same was argued by the russian psychologist lev 
s. vygotskij (1896–1934), even if Thảo never quoted him. Thus, to Thảo, 
the evolution of language, too, proceeds from the collective to the particular.
5. The Second Hypothesis on Language Origins
in pdm, language played a role, but not a very relevant one, because it was 
simply the mental reflex of social praxis. Thảo’s perspective changed in his 
ilc: the language is no longer a reflex of social life but rather one of the 
most essential elements of social praxis. so Thảo dealt with the three main 
stages of the evolution of the language of real life – pointing, syntax, and 
fully-formed language. There are no clear-cut distinctions between these 
three stages but proximate overlaps, slow transitions and coexistence.
To explain the evolution of language, Thảo described the interactions 
of some elements: physiology and anatomy, communication, tool-making, 
cognition, social relations, and environment. so Thảo’s theory of language 
evolution in his ilc seems to be more similar to engels’ view rather than 
to the theory set out in pdm. in 1951 Thảo explained the origins of human 
language without taking into account the evolution of humans: linguistic 
skills arose among our fully-formed human ancestors. To engels, in contrast 
with that, the evolution of humans reveals a gradual development of anatomy 
(hands, brain, and senses), social life (labour, communication), and cognitive 
skills (language and consciousness). each factor influenced the others and 
vice versa and language progressively evolved together with the other 
factors. in the same way, Thảo’s ilc chronicled the slow evolution of both, 
language and cognition, and their interactions with the social and physical 
environment. in addition, he linked the stages of human evolution with 
the corresponding phases of child development as they had been discussed 
by piaget and Thérèse gouin-décarie (1923– ).
To Thảo tool-making is the most decisive factor in the evolution 
of language. To him anthropoids already use “natural instruments” as objects 
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which satisfy immediate needs. instruments of this kind are the result 
of the individual “work of adaptation”. The preparation and use of natural 
instruments take place in front or beside the biological object and are 
abandoned when the need disappears. similarly, the communication systems 
of apes and anthropoids, such as “cries” and “simple indications”, refer to 
the emotional aspect of the immediate situation. Thảo called signs of this 
kind “signs of presentation”. 
instead, language of hominids was composed of the repetition of a set 
of indicative gestures and vocalizations which referred to absent objects. 
in this regard, the evolution of the hand had considerably changed the living 
condition of our ancestors. during the recession of tropical forests towards 
the end of the Tertiary period (2, 58 ma), Thảo wrote that the first examples 
of australanthropus began to live in groups and worked in coordination to survive 
and adapt themselves to new environmental conditions. The australanthropus 
“prepared and conserved instruments” and got the means of subsistence from 
“collective hunting”. Those cooperative activities required a certain distance 
between individuals and, as a result, the australanthropus displayed guidance 
gestures. such a conclusion echoes the results of the russian psychologist 
a. spirkin (1918–2004). guidance gestures were firstly referred to as objects 
that were perceptible in the environment. since the systematic use of guidance 
gestures had been established, those signs began to indicate absent objects 
of biological needs and entailed the cognitive representation of them. 
To Thảo guidance gestures were simultaneously composed of motions of the 
hand along with cries. in the second chapter of the book signs of this kind 
were called become “signs of representation” (Thảo, [1973] 1984, p. 59) and 
“syncretic word” (70).
Before the oldowan phase (ca. 2, 6 – 1, 7 ka), “elaborated instruments”, 
or Kafuan instruments, were produced with the systematic help of another 
tool. The new working situations required a “straight-line gesture” which 
served to indicate the current work-object as well as everything interesting 
that could function as a possible work object. signs of this kind were called 
by Thảo «typical name available to the group» (Thảo, [1973] 1984, p. 126). 
hominids systematically used signs of representation such as guidance 
gestures and straight-line gestures. This fact involved the internalization 
of those signs. This dynamic corresponds to the neurophysiological process 
which fixes in the brain the traces of a given social habit. This is the first 
step of the specific ability to abstract away from a concrete situation that one 
can observe in humans. hominids began to point out straight-line gestures 
to each other. and this use of gestures was the condition for having complex 
interpersonal relations («relation of reciprocity»).
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The social origin of that communication system (language of real life) 
developed a shared point of view that Thảo ([1973] 1984, pp. 12–13) called 
“collective cognizance”. This one preceded the self-awareness of each 
individual as such. 
The internalization of the language of real life involved self-awareness 
and “inner language”. and inner language considerably increased 
the cognitive skills of our ancestors. so cognitive skills – such as the ability to 
abstract, self-awareness, social cognition, and so on – are the result of social 
interactions because they depend upon collective cooperative activities. 
Thảo’s purpose was to establish the cognitive function of “syncretic 
words” – i.e. the intrinsic signs which were simultaneously composed 
of vocalizations and gestures. syncretic words, he insisted, had allowed 
the most elementary representation of the “confused form” of the object. 
for this reason he called syncretic words “functional names”. Thảo’s next 
step was to describe the transition from the functional name to the typical 
name which took place during the Kafuan period (lower paleolithic, 
2, 6 ma – 300 ka). To him, the typical name involved a form of representation 
of the object that he calls «typical image» (Thảo, [1973] 1984, p. 99): this 
representation could be regarded as a prototype of a group of objects and, 
to be clear, it should not be confused with the abstract concept. The typical 
image served, for instance, as a model for the reproduction of instruments. so 
Thảo emphasised that the archaeological evidence shows a standardization 
of the elaboration of instruments during the Kafuan period.
australanthropus began to connect two syncretic words with the help 
of the connection of the two subjacent gestures. and only when the stage 
of the australanthropus came to a close, the development of the lateral 
tubercle (Broca’s area) entailed “the inhibition of sounds immediately after 
their emission which allows one to differentiate them by passing distinctly 
from one to the other” (Thảo, [1973] 1984, 55–56). Then spoken language 
became ever more pervasive. Thảo insisted that collective hunt in small groups 
required a communication system which was less equivocal than isolated 
syncretic words. indeed syncretic words were extensively polysemous and 
thus they were understood only within a given perceptive field. h. habilis 
(2, 5–2,5 ma) began to systematically link typical names in order to produce 
elementary sentences, the so-called “functional sentences” (Thảo, [1973] 
1984, 82). The need to communicate among sub-groups played the leading 
part in using a more efficient communication system during a collective hunt. 
such communication did not present sentences in a strict sense, which are 
defined by syntactic linking, but performed the same function by referring to 
relations between things. 
113Trần Đức Thảo: A Marxist Theory of the Origins of Human Language
during the oldowan period (2, 6–1,7 ka), functional sentences were used 
to represent an absent scene instead of drawing attention to single objects 
or prototypes. slowly, h. habilis began to connect elementary functional 
sentences in order to express the so-called “developed functional sentence”. 
slowly, a quantitative mechanical process increased the level of the syntactic 
complexity. To Thảo there was no qualitative gap between sentences of 
h. habilis and those of h. sapiens. To him, the development of ever more 
complex syntactic constructions began with a three-terms fundamental 
structure: “this here (T) in a motion (m) in some form (f), or Tmf”. Together, 
those three terms (T, m, and f) represent the fundamental keys to produce 
almost all the sentences until a fully-formed language emerges. interestingly, 
it seems that Thảo did not essentially separate the development of the syntax-
semantics interface. 
Before the age of h. neanderthalensis (200 ka – 40 ka), language was 
already fully-formed. at the beginning of the chellean period(~ 1, 7 ka), 
the pithecantropus (1 ma – 7000, 000) revealed the ability to have, in advance, 
the representation of the long series of operations involved in tool-making 
(biface). simultaneously, functional sentences became “sentences in the strict 
sense”. They were nothing but the result of the connection of two or more 
sentences. Thảo’s considerations might recall the cognitive and practical 
analogy between instrument-production and syntactic structures suggested 
by leroi-gourhan (1964–65). Thảo, however, did not explicitly suggest that 
sentences and operative chains had the same structures.
6. Conclusions
historians of linguistic ideas have rarely paid attention to Thảo’s linguistic 
theory (some exceptions are Baribeau, 1986; Barthes, 1951 (about his 
philosophy); federici, 1970; mchale, 2002; herrick, 2005). Thảo’s 
hypothesis, however, deserves a special mention. The above examination 
of Thảo’s major works would seem sufficient to effectively summarise 
the meaning of his theory of the origins of human language. in detail, Thảo’s 
ilc took up the questions which were left open in his first book: how did 
language evolve from non-language? how did stimulus-bound animal 
communication become symbolic? Which of human ancestors already 
possessed some form of language? These questions are the same that are 
at the heart of the current debate on the origins of language (pleyer, 2011).
certainly, Thảo’s theory, as has been seen, was deeply influenced 
by contemporary ideologies. nonetheless, his perspective can serve as 
114 Jacopo D’Alonzo
a touchstone by which the current proposals may be judged. Just to mention one 
example in this regard, Tomasello et al.(2005, 690) basically continue along 
the same line as Thảo. according to Tomasello, the evolution of language 
lies in the evolution of the ability for shared intentionality that enables us to 
develop a shared point of view as well as shared goals, plans, and intentions 
in cooperative activities within a joint attentional frame and a shared frame 
of reference. To Thảo, however, the ability for shared intentionality is the 
prerequisite of individual intentionality rather than being its development. 
additionally, the evolution of that ability depends upon the need to cooperate 
rather than being the condition for having cooperation.
at the same time, Thảo’s theory posed a challenge to marxism: could 
dialectic materialism successfully explain the origins of language? so Thảo 
rigorously pursued the implications of dialectical materialism to focus on the 
heuristic potentialities of that insight. To him, dialectical materialism gave 
the best explanation for the social origins of language without transcending 
the natural dimension. To him, language faculty is located in the brain and 
depends upon some bodily predispositions. But this does not mean that 
language evolved in the brain alone. The fact is that language is first and 
foremost a social praxis. so it is shared by a group within the concrete and 
material horizon of labour. Thảo meant by labour the process encompassing 
all the cooperative collaborative activities necessary for the production of the 
means of subsistence. and the language of real life was indissolubly bound 
to labour.
Thảo’s emphasis on labour (collective hunting, tool-making, etc.) makes 
his theory like those of many recent scholars such as lieberman (1984), 
Burling (1999), arbib (2005), stout (2008), and Bickerton (2009). according 
to Thảo, tool-making must fulfil a dual task, to be the heuristic principle 
to deduce the cognitive skills of our ancestors and to be the explicative 
principle of the evolution of social habits. on the one hand the archaeological 
discoveries reveals the way the mind of our ancestors worked and on the 
other hand the evolution of practical skills involved in tool-making is the 
point of departure to suggest a hypothesis on the evolution of language. 
in other words, Thảo argued that cooperative hunting, social learning, tool-
making, and faculty of language share the same cognitive background. from 
this point of view, he suggested something similar to what has been set out 
by some recent scholars such as gärdenfors (2003), osvath and gärdenfors 
(2005), and spelke (1990; 2000).
The idea Thảo developed in this way was based on the assumption 
that language is a social tool. so Thảo focussed squarely on the fact that 
language is something that a given individual could find in the social 
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environment. in fact, the language of real life might be regarded as a social 
tool shared by a group during cooperative collective activities. This language 
could be internalised by individuals and, thus, entails self-consciousness. 
so the language of real life become a way of expressing something that 
is characteristic of a particular person. it must be said that Thảo did not 
dismiss the role played by the extra-linguistic context insofar he explained 
how communicative acts could be meaningful. for these reasons, Thảo’s 
theory may recall some assumptions of externalism (parent, 2013) and 
the token-reflexive approach (reichenbach, 1947). language and other 
communicative acts, indeed, must be studied against the background of real 
communication. and that background is nothing but the pragmatic and 
physical frame of reference. To Thảo, cognitive and linguistic processes 
are rooted in physical interactions of the body with the physical and social 
environment. instead, recent theories of embodied cognition seem to neglect 
the role of social environment (as Borghi and cimatti, 2015, have already 
remarked).
for those reasons, Thảo’s theory meets the need of an interdisciplinary 
approach in the field of the research on the evolution of language. Thảo 
acknowledged that research on that topic must be intimately related to 
the findings of biology, too, as today it is widely accepted by the scientific 
community. (fitch, hauser and chomsky, 2005, p. 180). interestingly, he 
had, however, a peculiar idea of biology which was extensively influenced by 
Trofim d. lysenko’s (1898–1976) epigenetic model (levins and lewontin, 
1985). Thus not only did Thảo suggest that the development of the brain 
could entail the evolution of language, he also set out that language, in turn, 
may change the brain and the corresponding cognitive skills. nowadays, this 
dynamic is called co-evolution of brain and language (deacon, 1998, p. 113). 
But nobody should forget that to Thảo the social praxis mediates the mutual 
influence of language and brain.
in contrast to many today’s scholars, Thảo previously provided a general 
semiotic theory to support his hypothesis. This approach avoids the danger 
of the highly variable terminology which can be seen in several current studies. 
in detail, Thảo refused to merely condemn the non-wholly arbitrary signs, 
insofar they permit to suggest a hypothesis on semiogenesis of language. so 
he preserved the term sign in order to explicitly deprive it of all the privileges 
accorded it by scholars who regard a fully-formed language as a model 
of any semiotic system. Thus the question facing Thảo in his ilc was how 
a fully-formed language evolved from what, nowadays, Bickerton (1998, p. 
341) calls protolanguage. Thảo, thus, seems to advocate a form of continuity 
approach (pinker and Bloom, 1990; pinker and Jackendoff, 2005). By virtue 
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of this, he correspondingly described the evolution of linguistic skills among 
all symbol-using species in the homo lineage (just like deacon, 1998, p. 
340f.). it is significant that, according to Thảo, the development of labour 
marks the most relevant shift between humans and other animals.
Thảo’s semiotics offers some tools to assess some assumption which are 
extensively employed by recent scholars. for instance, clark and Brennan 
(1991) use the terms “joint attentional frame” or “common ground” to describe 
that which gives a pointing gesture its meaning. Thảo would not have agreed 
with this definition. according to him, the joint attentional frame does not 
really work as something brought in from the outside. The pointing gestures 
are already meaningful. in fact, Thảo’s genetic semiotics is based on the 
revaluation of motivated signs. and for this reason, motivated signs involve 
joint-attention rather than being determined by it. indeed pointing gestures 
are displayed to draw attention to a specific situation within collective 
cooperative task. They are nothing but cooperative pointing gestures.
Thảo’s emphasis on the peculiar semantic and syntactic features 
of gestural communication systems – which could be at best punctuated 
with grunts and other vocalizations – may recall corballis (2003). To Thảo, 
the development of a fully-formed language follows a slow process that has 
led the original holistic communication system to the analytical structure 
of modern languages. mithen (2005) has recently suggested something like 
that but he does not set out that holistic communication of our ancestors 
could be regarded as the only precursor of a fully-formed language. This fact 
reveals one of the main conundrums of Thảo’s theory: how the development 
of the linear analytical order of words could explain the recursive procedures 
of fully-formed languages? indeed Thảo was interested in the interactions 
between semantics and syntax rather than in the evolution of syntactical 
structures as such. for this reason it seems that he suggested a theory of the 
iconic nature of syntax (Burling, 1999).
for the same reason one may ask if the processes of internalisation and 
abstraction described by Thảo could explain the transition from motivated 
referential syncretic words to arbitrary signs. Thảo’s answer was that this 
process did not end in a prehistoric phase but rather continues in everyday life. 
motivated signs constantly support the conventional construction of systems 
of arbitrary signs. To Thảo, the most elementary understanding of a given 
speech act is enabled by the motivated features of communication (gestures, 
mimics, syntax, intonation, etc.), the frame of reference, and shared practical 
purposes.
The previous comparison between Thảo’s theory and the current trends 
of the research on the evolution of language should not be taken as an attempt 
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to legitimize the vietnamese philosopher. against that, we would regard 
Thảo neither as a naïve forerunner nor as a brilliant visionary. a given theory 
set out in the past must be seen as a historical phenomenon. But it does not 
mean that such a theory cannot offer valuable insights on how it is best to 
proceed for tackling current issues. indeed the evolution of language is a 
field of research that cannot neglect the problematic nature and weakness 
of its methods, paradigms, and assumptions. Today, for instance, the main 
trend of that field of research should be interdisciplinary in nature. a cross-
disciplinary type of research must suggest principles that would allow to 
connect data from different disciplines. But the principles which have been 
suggested so far need to be discussed further on because they still lack 
a shared common framework. consequently, nobody can reject ancient 
theories in advance insofar as they may enable the debate to focus on the 
plausibility and potentialities of currently available assumptions.
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